Two Ways to Own Your Identity Online: The EU Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI) vs. LINKSPREED's UIID

Introduction

Almost everyone has been through this routine. You open a bank account, rent a flat or sign up to a new service. You photograph your ID, upload proof of address, type the same data again and wait for someone to check it. A commentator at Euronews recently described this as more than an irritation. He argues it weighs on Europe’s economy through abandoned transactions, duplicated verification costs, fraud losses and cross-border friction. Europe’s answer is the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI). By the end of 2026, every EU member state must offer one. At the same time, a very different answer has been growing from the bottom up. It is UIID, built by LINKSPREED, which starts from the user’s device and not from the state’s register.

This article compares both in depth:

the legal foundation and the thinking behind each,
the structure and the providers,
the technology,
privacy, security and anonymity,
the political background, including Chat Control,
and an honest look at the limits of both.

The conclusion is simple. Whether you want an EU wallet is a personal decision. It is free, voluntary and useful for certain things. But for the open internet, where most of our daily life happens and where a legal name is rarely needed, UIID offers something the wallet was never designed to give: real anonymity, aliases, machine-checked privacy and an identity that works for people, organisations and AI agents alike. That is why UIID has an outsized value for what LINKSPREED calls Web4, the next stage of the internet.

You can try it yourself right now and claim a free Core ID at uiid.me.

PART 1: THE EU DIGITAL IDENTITY WALLET

1.1 Where it comes from

The wallet is the third stage of a long project. The original eIDAS Regulation of 2014 aimed to create a digital single market through electronic identification and trust services, such as signatures and seals. A later evaluation found that the rollout was uneven. Only 14 member states had notified at least one national eID scheme, and the regulation had not achieved its goal of cross-border identification for public services. The answer was a revision. After trilogue negotiations, the final vote came on 30 April 2024. The result is Regulation (EU) 2024/1183, called eIDAS 2.0, which entered into force on 20 May 2024.

1.2 The legal promise

The regulation states its purpose directly. All natural and legal persons in the Union should have secure, trusted and seamless cross-border access to public and private services, while having full control over their data. Each member state must provide at least one wallet. A wallet can be provided in three ways:

directly by a member state,
under a mandate from a member state,
independently of a member state, but recognised by it.

The wallet itself is defined as an electronic identification means. It lets the user store, manage and validate identity data and attestations, provide them to relying parties, and sign with qualified electronic signatures or seals.

1.3 The timeline

The countdown starts from the entry into force of the first implementing acts. Five were adopted on 28 November 2024, published on 4 December 2024 and in force from 24 December 2024.

Date	Milestone
24 Dec 2026	Each member state must provide at least one wallet
10 Jul 2027	Anti-money-laundering rules apply, and eID becomes a legal route for customer verification
24 Dec 2027	Regulated private companies must accept the wallet on request
11 Aug 2028	The portrait becomes a mandatory attribute

The acceptance duty is narrower than many assume. It applies where strong user authentication is required by law. In practice that means banking and payments, healthcare, telecoms onboarding and similar regulated sectors. Micro and small enterprises are exempt. The real-world picture is behind schedule. Reporting from 1 October 2026 says about 24 of 27 member states had no wallet available and were expected to miss the deadline. Experts surveyed in 2026 voiced low confidence that all member states would deliver on time. They also named unclear business cases and a lack of awareness as obstacles.

1.4 The German example: “d-you”

Germany’s wallet is called d-you. The Federal Cabinet approved the Digital Identities Act, and the minister announced the name on 9 September 2026. The Bundestag held its first reading on 23 September 2026, with the wallet planned for general availability from January 2027. Key points from the government’s own statements:

Use is free and voluntary. Existing means of identification are not replaced.
It is described as the first electronic identification means at assurance level “high” for mobile devices in Germany.
Alternative, non-state wallet providers are expected to get certification only about twelve months after the state wallet launches.
A stated goal is reducing dependence on non-European platforms.

PART 2: HOW THE EU WALLET IS BUILT

2.1 The cast of characters

The EUDI system is a multi-party ecosystem with no single owner by design. The user picks a wallet from a certified provider, an issuer places a credential into whatever wallet the user has, and a verifier accepts it anywhere in the member states.

Role	What it does
User	Holds the wallet and decides what to share
Wallet provider	Builds and operates the wallet, and issues attestations about the wallet itself
PID provider	Issues the Person Identification Data, meaning the core identity
Attestation providers	Issue other credentials, such as driving licences, diplomas or professional qualifications
Relying parties	Banks, authorities and shops that request data; they must register and declare what they will ask for
Registrars and registers	Public lists of the parties relying on the wallet
Access certificate providers	Issue certificates that verify the authenticity and validity of relying parties

The European Commission even operates a dashboard where member states notify PID providers, wallet providers, registrars and certificate providers. This is a trust model built around lists of approved parties.

2.2 The technical stack

The reference document is the Architecture and Reference Framework (ARF). It defines the core wallet functions, requirements for relying parties, qualified attestations, certification, publication of certified wallets and security breaches. It sets out design principles, including user-centricity, accessibility, privacy, security and cross-border interoperability. The main building blocks:

Protocols. OpenID4VCI is used for issuing credentials, and OpenID4VP for presenting them.
Credential formats. SD-JWT and mdoc, both built for selective disclosure. With SD-JWT, the issuer signs a credential in which every claim can be hidden or revealed individually. The mdoc format used for mobile driving licences lets users release individual data elements.
Secure key storage. Keys live in a Wallet Secure Cryptographic Device (WSCD). The ARF recognises four architectures:
1. local native, using the phone’s own security chip such as Apple’s Secure Enclave or Google’s StrongBox,
2. local internal, such as an eSIM,
3. local external, such as a smartcard,
4. remote, meaning a hardware security module run by the provider.
The principle is that keys are generated inside the device and never leave it.
Attestation of the wallet itself. The Wallet Unit Attestation proves to an issuer that the wallet is genuine and that its keys are protected to the required level. A separate Wallet App Attestation checks the integrity of the app.
Cloud option in Germany. The German architecture includes a remote WSCD. The user authenticates with two factors, and key operations are forwarded to a hardware security module.

In plain words: the system is built to make a state-issued identity portable, verifiable and hard to forge. It does this with certified hardware, lists of approved parties and standardised formats.

2.3 What the wallet offers the user

The law lists a strong set of functions. Users must be able to:

request, store, share and delete identity data under their sole control,
use selective disclosure,
generate pseudonyms and store them encrypted and locally,
see a dashboard of all transactions, request erasure and report suspicious requests to the data protection authority,
sign with qualified electronic signatures and seals,
download their data.

Several rules add protection:

Wallet providers must not collect information on wallet use beyond what is necessary.
They must keep wallet data logically separate from their other services.
Where identification is not necessary, the design should prevent tracking and linking of transactions.

The source code of the application components must be open-source licensed.

PART 3: WHAT THE EU GETS RIGHT

A fair comparison starts with credit.

Legal power. A qualified electronic signature or assurance level “high” identity carries legal weight that no private system can create alone. For a mortgage, a tax matter or a notarised contract, this is the right tool.
A better default than passport scans. Sharing a signed “over 18” instead of a full ID is a real improvement.
Transparency by law. Open source, a dashboard, registered relying parties and a reporting channel are written into the regulation.
Voluntary and free. Citizens do not have to use it, and analogue services remain.
Movement towards zero-knowledge proofs. The EU’s age-verification blueprint now defines zero-knowledge proof as the mandatory presentation mechanism. It states that no identity or date of birth is shared and that visits to different services cannot be correlated. France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland are piloting it in 2026. Even Brussels sees where the technology must go.

PART 4: THE CRITICAL VIEW OF THE EU MODEL

Strong goals do not automatically produce strong architecture. This section collects the documented concerns.

4.1 Unlinkability is weaker than the promise

The law says the technical framework must not let issuers or any other party obtain data that allows transactions or behaviour to be tracked, linked or correlated. The current technology, however, relies on batch issuance of one-time credentials. Researchers at the Hasso Plattner Institute call this a weak form of unlinkability, in which a corrupt issuer can still link and trace users. Their reasoning is easy to follow. Digital signatures are great for security but bad for privacy, because a signature works like a unique identifier. Zero-knowledge proofs would allow unlinkability across repeated use. The first version of the wallet does not use them because the standards were not ready. A 2026 research paper goes further. It shows that a malicious issuer could deviate from the protocol so that verifiers holding a short tracing key can de-anonymise users, and users cannot detect it. The Commission’s own discussion paper lists collusion between relying parties and attestation providers, data breaches and wholesale surveillance among the privacy risks. It names zero-knowledge proofs as a possible future mitigation.

4.2 Protections reversed in the technical rulebook

The civil rights organisation epicenter.works has followed the wallet for years. Its warning: “the Commission has no qualms about reversing protections it just agreed to introduce”, and safeguards won in the legislative process can disappear in a technical annex. Its list of five problems:

Loopholes for registration certificates allow over-asking.
Weakened pseudonymity rights enable over-identification.
Mandatory biometric facial images in the minimum data set.
Big Tech can circumvent genuine wallet integration.
Tracking protections are fundamentally weakened.

The first point deserves a closer look. Relying parties must register what data they need and are not allowed to ask for more. But the current draft makes the registration certificates optional, which would let a company register in a member state that does not issue them and request data across the EU with no automatic check. Earlier, 15 civil society organisations had already warned that this would let a company like a large social platform bypass the protections. European Digital Rights (EDRi) reports that the wording was changed from “prevent” tracking to “hinder” tracking. A national data protection authority is among those who point out that technical enforcement against over-asking is limited. In plain words: you are protected mainly by registers and law, not by mathematics.

4.3 Dependence on Google and Apple

This is the point that surprises most people. The German architecture documentation names Google’s Play Integrity API for Android and Apple’s DeviceCheck and App Attest for iOS. The German guidelines state that Play Integrity cannot be used without Google Play services. Reports say this locks out people on alternative systems such as GrapheneOS or /e/OS. One analysis points out that a vendor-neutral Android hardware attestation exists, but wallet developers do not use it. The irony is hard to miss. The German government lists reduced dependence on non-European platforms as a goal, while the current technical design leans on two American platform companies.

4.4 The browser trust fight (Article 45)

The regulation also reaches the web itself. Article 45 requires browsers to recognise qualified website authentication certificates issued by providers that member states have approved. Mozilla and other companies that build and secure the internet warned that these articles are likely to weaken the security of the Internet as a whole. The other side calls this misinformation and says these certificates face more audits than ordinary ones. The debate is real on both sides. It shows how much of the framework is about state-defined trust.

4.5 Slow and uneven rollout

Twenty-seven states are producing 27 timelines. Several are expected to ship a minimal wallet in December and improve it during 2027. Expert respondents also point out that availability is not adoption. Success depends on user experience, useful applications, business models and public trust.

PART 5: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND, INCLUDING CHAT CONTROL

The wallet and Chat Control are different laws. Nobody should claim the wallet is a surveillance tool. But they belong to the same political climate, and anyone choosing an identity system should understand it.

5.1 What “Chat Control” means

The term is used by critics for the proposed EU regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. The Commission proposed it in May 2022. It would oblige providers to detect, report and remove abuse material. Everyone agrees that child abuse must be fought. The dispute is about the method, especially scanning private and encrypted messages.

5.2 The timeline

Council compromise, November 2025. Denmark first tried to revive mandatory detection orders, even for encrypted services. Strong opposition from several states, including the German government and the German Bar Association, ended that push. The Council’s position of 26 November 2025 removed mandatory scanning, introduced risk categories, created an EU Centre on Child Sexual Abuse and made the voluntary scanning regime permanent.
Remaining concerns. Amnesty International still criticised the compromise because it can incentivise disproportionate interference with privacy, and it called for clear safeguards for end-to-end encryption.
March 2026. The Parliament’s civil liberties committee rejected an extension of the temporary voluntary scanning regime by 38 votes to 28. Civil society cited the Commission’s own report, which found that only 0.000002735% of globally scanned content was confirmed as abuse material, with reported error rates of 13% to 20% for certain detection technologies.
April 2026. The plenary rejected the extension on 26 March, and the interim regime expired on 3 April 2026.
July 2026. Regulation (EU) 2026/1881 reinstated the interim rules until 3 April 2028. This time the text expressly excludes communications protected by end-to-end encryption and says it must not be read as weakening encryption.
The permanent law is still stuck. According to one summary, Parliament wants a court order and scanning limited to suspected individuals or groups. Five trilogue rounds have failed, and the 29 June 2026 round collapsed.

5.3 Why this matters for identity

In September 2026 the Commission proposed the EU KIDS ACT, which sets 15 as the minimum age to create an independent account. Age limits need age checks, and age checks need identity infrastructure. The Commission’s age-verification solution is described as interoperable with future wallets and built on the same specifications. This is not proof of bad intent. It is a reason for caution. Political priorities change quickly, as the Chat Control back-and-forth shows. A system that is anonymous by cryptographic design is far more robust against future political compromises than a system that is private only as long as the rules stay the same.

PART 6: UIID, A DIFFERENT STARTING POINT

6.1 The company

UIID comes from LINKSPREED LLC, a technology company founded in 2025 (previously Linkspreed UG) and headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Its mission is a decentralised ecosystem in which users and businesses own their data. Products include:

TribeMaker, for instant community building,
ATRIUM, for organisations that need scalable social-network solutions such as corporate intranets, internal communities and white-label options,
UIID, the identity system,
an AI app that integrates the services.

LINKSPREED lists UIID with the identity-industry publication Biometric Update. Developer material is public on GitHub, including a UIID Cookbook for building Web4 applications with the API and Web4 Lite as an open-source foundation.

6.2 The core idea

UIID is described as a local-first identity protocol. It generates cryptographically secure identities directly on the device, uses device biometrics and zero-knowledge proofs, and aims to remove passwords and centralised data stores. The difference in starting point is the key to everything that follows:

The EU wallet takes an identity that the state already issued and makes it digital, portable and verifiable.
UIID starts with a key that you create yourself on your device. You then decide what to prove about it, to whom, and under which alias.

6.3 The architecture in detail

Two layers: Core ID and Aliases

The central design is a dual-layer split identity. A master Core ID sits behind many context-specific Aliases. The stated goal is to stop platforms from cross-correlating behaviour or tracking people across independent services. LINKSPREED explains that the secret is stored only on the device, and that zero-knowledge proofs confirm ownership of the identity and alias without exposing private data. The enterprise single sign-on announcement describes the same two-level architecture together with one-click biometric verification. In plain words: every website sees a separate alias, so two websites cannot compare notes about you.

Passwordless by design

UIID relies on WebAuthn, which replaces passwords with cryptographic key pairs generated locally and unlocked via biometrics. This removes central password databases. The company argues that requiring local biometrics makes mass bot networks and throwaway deepfake profiles economically and technically unrealistic. That is a claim from the company itself, but the logic is clear: fake accounts get expensive if every identity needs a real device and a real person.

A developer interface

The v1 API is based on OAuth 2.0, with granular scopes and mandatory multi-factor authentication for critical access. LINKSPREED also promotes an embeddable login button. The snippet is said to carry the complete sign-in flow without server-side code and to keep sensitive credentials off the client side. For enterprises, it positions UIID as a single sign-on solution that avoids database “honeypots” and aligns with GDPR and eIDAS.

No mandatory identity check

Version 1.2 (released on 9 November 2025) removed mandatory centralised identification, known as KYC. LINKSPREED positioned it as an anonymous, globally usable identity that users determine themselves. It also added Cloudflare integration for speed and security.

A bridge from the old web

Adoption of any new identity system depends on how easily people can get in. Version 2.6.5 added one-click registration using existing credentials from Google, Meta, GitHub or Microsoft, together with infinite aliases. According to the company, the connection to legacy tracking is severed once human status is verified. The stated goal is to bridge 100 social logins by 2027.

UIID WRAP: identity for websites that don’t know UIID

Announced in October 2026, UIID WRAP extends UIID to websites that have not integrated it. It detects registration forms, generates isolated aliases, prepares data-minimised credentials and fills compatible forms. The user reviews everything before final submission. This addresses a weakness of every new identity system: it only works where services have adopted it.

Identity beyond humans (v2.8, June 2026)

With version 2.8, announced on 16 June 2026, UIID moved from a human-only framework to a multi-entity system. It defines six entity types, including human individuals, organisations and AI agents. Further details from the announcement:

Autonomous agent registration. Using a machine-readable skill.md protocol, AI agents can register their own UIID accounts.
Agent Factory. A control centre where creators issue provisioning tokens, start new machine processes and monitor fleet activity, resource use and trust scores.
Zero-trust provisioning. Static secrets and long-lived keys are replaced by dynamic single-use or multi-use authorisation tokens, so an intercepted token cannot compromise a whole fleet.

The wider product family

LINKSPREED has also announced UIID Mail, a decentralised email beta, and says development has started on UIID Coins. Another thread is the idea of identity as an addressing layer, an identity-addressed internet instead of one based on IP addresses. That is an ambitious vision and still early, but it shows the intent: identity as infrastructure, not as a form field.

6.4 The eIDAS angle

LINKSPREED says it is putting significant resources into building out eIDAS 2.0 verification for everyone and making it almost completely free, so that people can stay compliant without handing over personal data. This is the company’s own statement of intent. The public sources I found do not describe UIID as a state-notified or certified EU wallet, and this article does not claim that it is.

PART 7: THE DETAILED COMPARISON

7.1 Concept and philosophy

Question	EUDI Wallet	UIID
Core idea	Digital version of your state-issued identity and documents	Local-first identity you create on your device
Starting point	The state register	The user’s device key
Trust anchor	Lists of approved providers and certificates	Cryptographic keys, local biometrics and zero-knowledge proofs
Default stance on identity	“Prove who you are,” with minimal disclosure	“Prove only what is needed,” under an alias
Origin	EU law and a public project	Private company and open protocol

7.2 Structure and providers

Question	EUDI Wallet	UIID
Who runs it	Member states, mandated providers or recognised providers	LINKSPREED, with an API for third parties
Number of parties	Many (wallet, PID, attestation providers, registrars, certificate providers)	One protocol with developer integrations
Who can issue credentials	Approved issuers on official lists	Not applicable in the same sense; the user creates the identity
Alternative providers	In Germany only about twelve months after the state wallet	Available today
Entities supported	Natural and legal persons	Six types, including AI agents and devices

7.3 Technology

Question	EUDI Wallet	UIID
Credential approach	Signed credentials with selective disclosure (SD-JWT, mdoc)	Zero-knowledge proofs as a core pillar
Authentication	Wallet unit attestation plus certified secure device	WebAuthn and local biometrics
Device dependency	Play Integrity and Apple checks in the German design	Public descriptions mention WebAuthn and local biometrics, not a platform gate
Developer integration	Standardised protocols and relying-party registration	OAuth 2.0 API, embeddable button, WRAP

7.4 Privacy and anonymity

Question	EUDI Wallet	UIID
Pseudonyms	Possible where identification is not legally required	Aliases are the core pattern
Unlinkability	Weak with batch issuance; a corrupt issuer can trace	Alias separation designed to prevent cross-service correlation
Protection against over-asking	Registration, but with optional certificates and limited technical enforcement	Alias model limits what any service can learn by default
Mandatory identity check	The wallet is built around a verified identity	Removed since v1.2
Where privacy comes from	Law, registers and rules	Cryptography and local control

7.5 Legal status and reach

Question	EUDI Wallet	UIID
Qualified signatures	Yes	Not offered as a qualified service
Assurance level “high”	Yes, for mobile in Germany	Not applicable
Acceptance obligations	Regulated private sectors from December 2027	None; adoption is voluntary
Use on any website	Only where integrated	Also via WRAP on non-integrated sites
Cost to users	Free	Free Core ID

PART 8: WHAT MAKES UIID SPECIAL

8.1 More anonymous

The wallet’s job is to prove who you legally are. That is useful for a bank, but unnecessary for most of the internet. Logging into a forum, reading a community feed or joining a chat does not require your legal name.

UIID turns the default around. Your Core ID stays private, and each service sees only an alias. Mandatory identity checks were removed in version 1.2. If one alias is leaked, sold or tracked, it leads nowhere else.

8.2 More private in the maths, not only in the rules

The HPI researchers show that the wallet’s current design cannot protect you from a dishonest issuer. The wallet’s protections against over-asking depend on registries and certificates that, according to civil society, have loopholes. UIID puts zero-knowledge proofs at the centre. The EU is moving in the same direction for age verification. UIID started there. The principle is simple: when privacy is built into the mathematics, it does not depend on a rule that someone can later rewrite.

8.3 Safer against leaks and fake accounts

There is no central password database to steal when keys are generated locally. Because identities are bound to local biometrics, creating thousands of fake accounts becomes costly. In a time of AI-generated fakes, that matters. (Again, this is the company’s description of its design.)

8.4 Less dependence on one platform’s approval

The German wallet needs Google or Apple attestation, and critics warn of lock-outs for people on alternative systems. UIID’s public descriptions rely on WebAuthn and local biometrics, and they do not describe such a gate.

8.5 One identity across the whole web

WRAP brings alias-based sign-up to sites that have never heard of UIID. The social-login bridge lowers the entry barrier. An embeddable login button lowers the barrier for website owners. The EU wallet, in contrast, only works where a service has integrated it, and acceptance is mandatory only in regulated sectors from December 2027.

8.6 Identity for machines, not only people

An EU wallet is designed for natural and legal persons. UIID already defines identities for AI agents, devices and organisations, with single-use provisioning tokens and fleet monitoring. In a web with millions of autonomous agents acting on people’s behalf, that is a very practical need.

PART 9: WHY UIID MATTERS FOR WEB4

LINKSPREED describes Web4 as a community-based internet in which users and businesses own their data. Three developments make a user-controlled identity layer more important there than on the old web.

1. Communities that run their own platforms. With social networks as a service, individuals and organisations can create their own networks. If every network needed its own account, the idea would fall apart. The single alias login solves this. A user proves ownership of one identity and one public alias across networks without exposing private data.

2. AI agents need verified identities. Agents often run on shared human credentials or static keys. The company’s argument is that Web4 requires verified AI identities, with each agent traceable to an accountable owner.

3. Identity as infrastructure. The company is exploring identity as an addressing layer, with UIID content about replacing the dependence on IP addresses. Even if only part of this vision materialises, it points to a future in which identity is not a login box but part of how the network works.

PART 10: HONEST LIMITS AND WHAT UIID STILL HAS TO PROVE

A comparison is only convincing if it is honest in both directions.

UIID is not a state-recognised identity. It cannot issue a qualified signature or serve as proof of legal identity in a regulated process. For those cases, the EU wallet is the right tool.
Most public evidence comes from LINKSPREED itself. I found press releases, videos, posts and a Biometric Update listing, but no independent security audit. A published audit and a public specification would be the strongest way to turn claims into proof.
The Web2 bridge is a trade-off. One-click registration with Google, Meta or Microsoft lowers the barrier. It also means a big platform sees the bridging step at the start, even if the connection is described as severed afterwards. Explaining this openly builds trust.
Some components are centralised by design. The Agent Factory is described as a centralised control centre. That is a sensible choice for managing fleets, but it should be clearly distinguished from the on-device privacy model.
Naming is inconsistent. Different LINKSPREED materials expand the abbreviation in different ways, such as Universal Internet Identity, Universal Integrated Identity or Unique Immutable Identity. A single, consistent explanation on the website would help.
Network effects are the real challenge. The EU can compel acceptance by law from 2027. UIID has to earn adoption website by website. WRAP, the embeddable button and the social-login bridge are sensible answers to this problem.

On the EU side, the honest limits were covered in Part 4. Both systems have real work ahead of them.

PART 11: THE DECISION IS YOURS

The two systems answer different questions. A simple guide:

Situation	Better fit
Opening a bank account, signing a contract, dealing with authorities	EU wallet
Qualified electronic signature	EU wallet
Proving age without revealing anything else	Both; the EU is piloting zero-knowledge age checks
Joining a forum, community or social network	UIID alias
Avoiding cross-site tracking	UIID alias
Signing up on a site you don’t trust	UIID WRAP
Giving AI agents their own identity	UIID
Running your own community platform	UIID with a social-network platform
You prefer not to depend on Google or Apple approval	Check UIID’s WebAuthn approach

Three points to keep in mind:

Using the wallet is voluntary. Both the EU and the German government say so. If you want one, get one. If you don’t, you are not forced to.
Using UIID does not exclude the wallet. You can hold both and use each where it fits.
The real question is how much of your digital life you want tied to a verified legal identity. Equally important is who you trust with that link, and how much of your privacy you want guaranteed by mathematics instead of by promises.

PART 12: GET STARTED

You can create your free Core ID in a few minutes at uiid.me. A good first test:

Create your Core ID.
Create your first alias for a community or service you use.
Try a passwordless login.
Try WRAP on a site that does not support UIID, and check how little the site needs to know about you.

Glossary (plain language)

eIDAS 2.0. The EU law that requires every member state to offer a digital identity wallet.
EUDI Wallet. The official EU digital identity app.
Relying party. A service that asks for data from your wallet, such as a bank or a shop.
Selective disclosure. Sharing only the facts you choose, for example “over 18” instead of your birth date.
Unlinkability. Two services cannot tell that they are talking about the same person.
Zero-knowledge proof. A way to prove a statement is true without revealing the underlying data.
WebAuthn. A standard for logging in with a key stored on your device and unlocked by fingerprint or face, instead of a password.
Alias. A separate public identity for one context, linked to your private Core ID only by you.
Chat Control. The critics’ name for EU proposals on scanning private messages for child abuse material.

Sources

Linkspreed Releases UIID v2.8, Ending the “Ghost Agent” Era with Sovereign Machine Identity
Sovereign Web4 Identity: Linkspreed UIID Protects Users and Autonomous Entities
Linkspreed LLC, Biometric Update
Announcement: LINKSPREED Introduces UIID WRAP for Total Identity Control
We’re making eIDAS 2.0 verification basically free (UIID)
Enterprise SSO Made Easy: LINKSPREED UIID Product Announcement
EUDI Wallet 2026: every deadline for wallets and businesses
Article 5a to 5f, eIDAS 2 text
EUDI Wallet privacy: selective disclosure and unlinkability
Invisible Traces: Subversion Attacks on Batch-Issued Credentials
Five problems the Commission must fix in the EU Wallet, epicenter.works
Interim Rules on Voluntary CSAM Detection Reinstated Until 2028, eucrim
Federal Cabinet: the digital wallet is coming
EU Age Verification Blueprint